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fact, prior to the uprisings the region's Sunni religious elite, the ʿulamāʾ (sing., ʿālim), had already been struggling to maintain their place as privileged interpreters of the Islamic tradition. The challenge had been navigating the "fragmentation" of their own authority following the rise of mass education, mass media, 2 and continual attempts by nation-state regimes to either co-opt them as a source of legitimacy or marginalize them entirely. 3 Responding to this new period of political and social instability would seem then to represent yet another daunting task. However, in terming the ʿulamāʾ "custodians of change," Muhammad Qasim Zaman has convincingly argued that there was more to their place in contemporary Muslim societies than a simple subservience to ruling elites, or a reactionary struggle against "modernity." Rather, Zaman viewed the activism and energy of the ʿulamāʾ in the emerging "religious public sphere," 4 as representing a continual "enlargement in their role qua ʿulamāʾ, in society as a whole" and the continued "political resonance" of the Islamic tradition in whose name they claim the right to speak. 5 For the purposes of this article then, and building on the work of Alasdair MacIntyre, tradition is understood as far more than simply an antonym to modernity, and instead represents the continual interaction through time between adherents to a common set of beliefs and texts, along with a shared language and style of argumentation about those beliefs and texts. 6 Along these same lines, Talal Asad proposed that the Islamic tradition, and for the purposes of this article the legal tradition of Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh), 7 should be approached as a "discursive tradition" that:
[C]onsists essentially of discourses that seek to instruct practitioners regarding the correct form and purpose of a given practice that, precisely because it is established, has a history. These discourses relate conceptually to a past (when the practice was instituted, and from the knowledge of its point and proper performance has been transmitted) and a future (how the point of that practice can best be secured in the short of long term, or why it should be modified or abandoned), through a present (how it is linked to other practices, institutions, and social conditions). An Islamic discursive tradition is simply a tradition of Muslim discourse that addresses itself to conceptions of the Islamic past and future, with reference to a particular Islamic practice in the present. 8 It was with these points in mind that Zaman then argued, "it is precisely their [the ʿulamāʾ 's] claims to authoritatively represent an 'authentic' Islamic tradition in its richness, depth and continuity that may have become the most significant basis of their new prominence in the public sphere."
9 As far as the Arab Uprisings are concerned, Khaled Abou El Fadl has previously highlighted in great detail that almost since Islam's inception the legal question of legitimate rebellion against a ruler has been almost ever-present for the ʿulamāʾ who, in their pursuit of what Asad termed an "authoritative discourse,"
10 always "balanced functionalist considerations against theological and moral imperatives, and constructed a highly technical and symbolic discourse [that] co-opted, constructed, and reconstructed doctrinal and historical precedents." 11 It is with these points in mind that this article similarly proposes that there is much to be learned about the ʿulamāʾ and the legal tradition's place in a post-uprising Middle East by following the fatwas, sermons and public statements of arguably the most prominent and visible ʿālim in the region (with his authority and popularity much harder to measure), the Doha-based Egyptian Shaykh Yusuf al- Qaradawi (b.1926 ).
Producing a "Global Mufti": The Rise of Yusuf al-Qaradawi
The early months of 2011 certainly provided more than a little evidence of al-Qaradawi's authority and popularity. Following the resignation of the Egyptian dictator Husni Mubarak (b.1928), not only did al-Qaradawi make a much publicized return to Cairo to deliver his famous "Tahrir Square Sermon" on 18 February 2011 to a crowd possibly numbering two million, 12 but just three days later during a live interview on al-Jazeera lasting a full twenty three minutes, al-Qaradawi then issued a fatwa calling for the killing of the then Libyan 8 Talal Asad, The Idea of an Anthropology of Islam (Washington, DC: Center for Contemporary Arab Studies, Georgetown University, 1986) 14. Italics in original. 9 Zaman, The Ulama in Contemporary Islam 180. 10 Asad defines his concept of an authoritative discourse as a notably constrained one, representing a "collaborative achievement between narrator and audience [where] the former cannot speak in total freedom: there are conceptual and institutional conditions that must be attended to if discourses are to be persuasive." Talal dictator Muʿammar al-Gaddafi (d.2011). In introducing his own translation of that fatwa, Yahya Michot anecdotally highlights some of the bases of the perceived authority and popularity that al-Qaradawi appeared to enjoy at the time:
Shaykh al-Qaradawi provides a remarkable illustration of the way jurisdictional magisterium is managed in contemporary Sunni Islam. There is no Caliphate. No state enjoys universal, uncontested leadership in Islamic matters […] The voices that the Umma often prefers to listen to originate from other quarters: charismatic scholars and activists independent of established political powers; transnational spiritual networks and movements; international organisations. Shaykh al-Qaradawi in some ways embodies these three dimensions in virtue of his personal qualities and endeavours, his closeness to the Muslim Brotherhood and his role as chairman of the International Union of Muslim Scholars. His credentials are thus impressive and his religious opinions have a particular weight. For many Muslims across the world, his fatwas represent an accurate, legitimate, orthodox actualisation in our time the teachings of Islam […] By calling for the killing of Gaddafi, Shaykh al-Qaradawi didn't in fact do anything other than meet his obligations as a renowned Mufti and meet the expectations of a great number of believers. 13 In other words, being considered an ʿālim is not simply an honorific title granted to graduates from long established Islamic centres of learning. Rather, as Michot implies in the above passage, it is a complex social construction whose multiple factors serve to produce alQaradawi as an acclaimed ʿālim to those among his peers, supporters, and critics who share an adherence to the tenets of the legal tradition. However, to be a respected scholar is one thing, being a "Global Mufti" who commands international attention requires rather more under today's circumstances, with political support and an astute utilisation of modern media technologies being only two such requirements.
14 Being a graduate of al-Azhar is certainly among the more important parts of alQaradawi's own identity however, clearly evidenced from his style of dress and manner. 15 In the specifically Egyptian context, al-Qaradawi would be considered part of what Malika Zeghal terms the "peripheral ʿulamāʾ," meaning those scholars who do not occupy positions of power and influence within the institution itself and prefer instead to associate themselves with activist, grassroots organisations such as, in al-Qaradawi's case, the Muslim Brotherhood. 16 Growing up in a poor village in the Nile Delta, al-Qaradawi first heard the Brotherhood's founder Hasan al-Banna (d.1949) preaching in 1941 while he was still a 13 Yahya Michot, "The fatwa of Shaykh Yûsuf al-Qaradâwî against Gaddafi," 15 March 2011, at: http://www.scribd.com/doc/51219918/The-fatwa-of-Shaykh-Yusuf-al-Qaradawi-against-Gaddafi (accessed 30 September 2013). All translations from Arabic will be the author's unless otherwise referenced. 14 In using this term for the title of their edited volume, Bettina Gräf and Jakob Skovgaard-Peterson describe alQaradawi as "easily one of the most admired and best-known representatives of Sunni Islam today. Indeed, it is difficult to identify any other Muslim scholar or activist who could be said to rival his status and authority, at least in the 15 In his own recollections al-Qaradawi writes that becoming a scholar of al-Azhar was a childhood dream, "I used to attend the lectures of the ʿulamāʾ and Shaykhs in our village. I loved them and realized that everyone loves them and admires them […] For me, then, al-Azhar was the bastion of religion and science." Yusuf alQaradawi, Risālat al-Azhar bayn al-Ams wa'l-Yawm wa'l-Ghad (Cairo: Maktabat Wahba, 1984) 3. For a detailed discussion of al-Qaradawi's relationship with the al-Azhar institution and his own vision for its future see Jakob Skovgaard-Petersen, "Yūsuf al-Qaraḍāwī and al-Azhar" in Global Mufti 27-53. 16 Zeghal, "Religion and Politics in Egypt" 2. student and, 17 joining the movement as soon as the opportunity arose, al-Qaradawi then quickly founded an organisation for the Brotherhood's Azhari student-members shortly after his own arrival there in 1946. As al-Qaradawi's prestige as a scholar of Islamic jurisprudence (sing., faqīh plr., fuqahāʾ) continued to rise after the publication of his two major works, The Lawful and the Prohibited in Islam and The Jurisprudence of Alms-Giving, 18 the Brotherhood offered al-Qaradawi the post of General Guide in 1976. In his refusal al-Qaradawi wrote he felt more suited to scholarship and preaching (daʿwa). It was during these early years of the "Islamic Awakening (al-Ṣaḥwa al-Islāmiyya)" that his attempts to "guide" what he saw as the wayward Arab youth along a middle path between religious extremism and secular laxity would first bring him broader attention among the Arab reading public.
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It was only later, however, through a manipulation of the proliferating satellite television stations, Islamic programs, and the growth of online social media, 20 that alQaradawi would come to be referred to as "one of the most celebrated figures in the Arab world." 21 In choosing those words, the prominent journalist Anthony Shadid (d. 2012) had particularly in mind the founding of the Qatari channel al-Jazeera in 1996. 22 9/11, and the subsequent wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, 27 all the while continuing to author well over one hundred books that were translated into multiple languages.
As far as the legal tradition is concerned, a key means by which al-Qaradawi facilitated and legitimated this increasing intervention in the public sphere was through a marked expansion of the originally classical legal concept of maṣlaḥa (commonly translated as the "public interest", or the "common good") to the extent that it "coincide [d] Translocal authority would thus be a social relationship of recognition that functions beyond (but not without) a local frame (which is, in this case, Doha)." Gräf, "Sheikh Yūsuf al-Qaraḍāwī in Cyberspace" 17 fn 58. 35 For a discussion of al-Qaradawi's views on his adoption of Qatari citizenship, and how it relates to his Egyptian identity in the context of his attempts to conceptualise a new "jurisprudence of citizenship (fiqh al-Protectorate until 1971) it has since been reported to hold nearly 14 per cent of the world's proven natural gas reserves and is now commonly ranked as the wealthiest country in the world in terms of gross domestic product per capita. 36 The Qatari royal family has been a key supporter of al-Qaradawi since his arrival, whether in relation to his assuming the directorship of the country's new Religious Institute in 1961, founding and then becoming Dean of Qatar University's Sharia Faculty in 1977, 37 or funding his trips across the world, to Pakistan, Malaysia, Indonesia, Europe, North America and even as far afield as Japan and South Korea. 40 it is important to note that the Qatari Emirs' role in enabling al-Qaradawi to become a seemingly obvious choice is apparent.
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All of these constituents combined, then, had contributed to the social construction of al-Qaradawi as a "Global Mufti" and ʿālim on the eve of the Arab Uprisings. The article will now explore the varying means by which al-Qaradawi has sought to maintain this position while balancing the series of horizontal political allegiances and local audiences that cumulatively propelled him to such prominence. As Michot highlighted, the perception of alQaradawi as a politically independent figure is a crucial theme in this regard and so, 42 As Gudrun Krämer puts it, "To be independent, or at least widely perceived as such, and at the same time be omnipresent on a global scale makes for a powerful mix." Gudrun Krämer, "Preface" in Global Mufti ix-xi (x).
al-Qaradawi has always argued that Qatari officials have never sought to unduly influence him, 43 particular attention will be accorded to this "Qatar Context" as the article progresses. Having situated al-Qaradawi among the constraints he will be seen to face (such as the Brotherhood, Qatar, and the expectations of an ʿālim), the article will follow al-Qaradawi and his articulation, transmission and reconstruction of the legal tradition through the past three years in an approximate chronological order, first looking to his initial navigation of the Egyptian uprising and the Libyan civil war by attempting to conceptualise a new "jurisprudence of revolution (fiqh al-thawra)." Then, as al-Qaradawi responded to the uprising in Bahrain and the increasing violence of the Syrian conflict, the question of sectarianism and Qatar's own foreign policies will come to the fore in the second section. With these themes in mind the final section will consider the responses of his multiple audiences (both scholarly and lay), and follow al-Qaradawi back to Egypt for the coup of 3 July 2013. It will examine how he tried to respond to the coup's aftermath and increasing criticism of his own public role, before drawing conclusions around the current place of leading Sunni ʿulamāʾ and the instabilities of the legal tradition in the politically fraught context of the Arab Uprisings. It is in Egypt, then, that the article will now move to join alQaradawi, and where the analysis will begin.
"A Scholar & A Tyrant": Qaradawi, Mubarak and Gaddafi
On 18 February 2011, the first Friday following the resignation of the former Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, al-Qaradawi returned to Cairo and delivered a sermon in Tahrir Square. Perhaps searching for a telling sound bite, commentators in the Egyptian media began to refer to him (both positively and negatively) as the "Egyptian Khomeini," 44 a billing then picked up by a number of Western outlets. 45 The Friday prayer, attended by crowds estimated by al-Jazeera to number nearly two million, would appear to show a leading Islamic scholar at the height of his authority and popularity. guide the Islamic Awakening toward the peaceful overthrow of the region's dictatorial regimes. One of his earliest works was in fact a play written during his first period of imprisonment in 1948 (re-written in 1968), entitled A Scholar and A Tyrant (ʿĀlim waṬāghiyya). Set in the aftermath of the Battle of Jamajim (701 CE) in present day Iraq and the defeat of ʿAbd al-Rahman Ibn al-Ashʿath's rebellion against the Umayyads, al-Qaradawi casts as his main character the rebellious jurist Saʿid b. Jubayr, 48 and the famous debate between himself and his captor al-Hajjaj b. Yusuf, leader of the Umayyad army. In telling his audience of Ibn Jubayr's defiance after capture in the second scene, al-Qaradawi often refers to the well-known hadith "the best Jihad is to speak a word of truth to an oppressive ruler." 49 Nowhere is this sentiment more clear for al-Qaradawi in the play, once frequently performed by Brotherhood members at their student gatherings, 50 than in the penultimate scene. Here Ibn Jubayr is called on to confess his blasphemy (kufr) in joining the rebellion, and alQaradawi has him respond with reference to another famous hadith that al-Qaradawi will be seen to cite often in the remainder of the article, "Our religion does not agree to obedience except to that which is good, and [we owe] no obedience to that which is disobedient (maʿsiyya) to [God] ." He then goes willingly to his execution. 51 The play has some clearly self-referential aspects and certainly al-Qaradawi's own understanding of his place in the legal tradition would appear to have required him to actively respond to the Arab Uprisings as they unfolded, for he and his fellow ʿulamāʾ have always rejected a distinction between the religious and the political realms, and the Arab secularist slogan "no politics in religion, and no religion in politics." As the uprisings spread from Tunisia to Egypt, al-Qaradawi actively aimed to provide an Islamic legitimacy to the protests, and counter the fatwas that began to be issued by rival Azhari ʿulamāʾ who called on the protesters to stay in their homes. While these opposing fatwas, such as those issued by the Egyptian Grand Mufti ʿAli Jumʿa (b.1952), drew on the more quietest precedents of the Islamic legal tradition that maintained obedience to an unjust ruler so long as they do not publically commit apostasy, 56 al-Qaradawi and his own supporters from IUMS contrastingly tried instead to conceptualize an entirely novel branch of Islamic jurisprudence, which they provocatively termed "the jurisprudence of revolution (fiqh al-thawra)."
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In his own examination of fiqh al-thawra's emergence more broadly, Aria Nakissa labelled the process whereby an ʿālim seeks to integrate their own novel and utilitarian reasoning into the conceptual framework of the legal tradition by creating a new field of fiqh as "secondary segmentation." A development from the earlier efforts of the reformer Rashid Rida (d.1935), its purpose is to allow an ʿālim to relax or overturn contradictory legal rulings while preserving the moral valence and authority of the structures of the Islamic legal tradition, while pre-empting criticisms of subjectivity. 58 It is this process that enables alQaradawi to reproduce the "conceptual and institutional conditions that must be attended to if discourses [and here we might say fiqh discourses,] are to be persuasive" and authoritatively argue against the fatwas issued by his rivals in support of the Mubarak regime. 59 In his own 59 Asad, Genealogies 210. In this vein al-Qaradawi's colleagues in the IUMS have also endeavoured to highlight how his utilitarianism was structured by the legal tradition's maxims (qawāʿid fiqhiyya) and the Al-Qaradawi Center has organised a competition to encourage other works in this vein, with the first prize totalling nearly 50 000 US Dollars. See Nakissa, "The Arab Spring"; Wasfi Abu Zayd, Al-Qaraḍāwī…al-Imām al-Thāʾir: Dirāsa discourse, then, Jumʿa drew upon the well-known jurisprudential maxim "sadd al-dharāʾiʿ (blocking the means [to a harmful outcome])" to rule that otherwise legitimate peaceful protests are rendered illegitimate on the basis that they will lead to fitna (civil strife); in his words, "I say to the youth of Egypt it is obligatory for all of you to withdraw […] coming out to challenge the legitimacy [of the regime] is forbidden (ḥarām), forbidden, forbidden! Right now you are guilty of causing this unrest which is not in the country's interests." By contrast, while affirming his own support for the concept of sadd al-dharāʾiʿ in principle, al-Qaradawi argued that the legitimate aims of the protests far outweighed the potential for fitna:
If they are used to achieve a legitimate end, such as calling for the implementation of the Sharia, Saddam Hussein as a threat. 64 Instead Qatar has now looked to ensure its security by cultivating the interest of outside powers (most notably the United States and the European Union) in its continued existence as an independent state. 65 While still nervous about the perceived threat from Iran, it was in this context that Qatar's attempted mediation in many of the region's conflicts prior to the recent uprisings (Darfur, Lebanon etc.) was viewed. 66 As the uprising in Libya shifted toward civil-war, Qatar's moves to assert its importance through its "soft power" became outright military intervention alongside NATO following UN Resolution 1973. Here the Muslim Brotherhood network of political émigrés that had grown up around al-Qaradawi proved notably useful, with his Libyan student ʿAli al-Sallabi, for example ("considered to be the most influential scholar among Libyans abroad"), serving as the key intermediary between Qatari officials and Brotherhood-affiliated militias inside Libya. http://www.swpberlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/aktuell/2012A07_sbg.pdf (accessed 1 October 2013). Moreover, this Qatari shift away from Saudi Arabia was prompted in part by the latter's perceived meddling in Qatari internal affairs, supporting a counter-coup against the Emir's father in 1995, and even armed clashes along their disputed border, itself seen as further motivation for Qatar to encourage the United States to establish a substantial military presence there. Allen J. Fromherz, Qatar: A Modern History (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2012) 92-3. 67 Steinberg, "Katar und der Arabische Frühling" 5; Khatib, "Qatar's foreign policy" 7. Originally from Benghazi, al-Sallabi had been living in exile in Doha since 1999 (his personal website can be accessed at: http://www.alsallaby.com/). At the same time however, there appears to have been no close relationship between al-Qaradawi and Jassim Sultan, the leader of the Qatari branch of the Muslim Brotherhood and is notable solely for the fact that it unilaterally dissolved itself in 1999. I am grateful to Kristan Diwan for this point. 68 boundaries of what is conceivable, legitimate and right." 69 With that in mind, al-Qaradawi's words were striking: I issue this fatwa: To the officers and the soldiers who are able to kill Muʿammar Gaddafi, to whoever among them is able to shoot him with a bullet and to free the country and [God's] servants from him. Do it! That man wants to exterminate the people. As for me, I protect the people and I issue this fatwa: Whoever among them is able to shoot him with a bullet and to free us from his evil, to free Libya and its great people from the evil of this man and from the danger of him, let him do so! 70 Al-Qaradawi's colleagues in IUMS moved quickly to support his position, while the Gaddafi regime appealed for support from other ʿulamāʾ in vain. 71 What is significant for this article is that, as in the Egyptian case, here al-Qaradawi dispenses with more quietist historical precedents in structuring his fatwa, and is again particularly creative. He expanded upon his legal reasoning in a sermon the following Friday, stating "it is from the jurisprudence of balancing (fiqh al-muwāzanāt), and the jurisprudence of consequential outcomes (fiqh almaʿālāt), and the jurisprudence of priorities (fiqh al-awlawiyyāt), that we sacrifice one man for the sake of the salvation of a people."
72 Al-Qaradawi's novel utilitarian reasoning can be seen to be consciously structured within the framework of the legal tradition in a manner not dissimilar from the new collocation "fiqh al-thawra." Al-Qaradawi's discourse does not dispense with precedent entirely, however, and he again cites the hadith voiced by Ibn Jubayr in his statement that the Libyan army's obeying orders is an act of "disobedience (maʿsiyya)" to God. 73 Similarly, in his affirmation of the Libyan rebels' martyrdom, he cited the Qurʾanic verse 3:169, "Think not of those, who are killed in the way of God, as dead. No, they are alive and provided sustenance from their Lord, rejoicing in what God has bestowed on them of His bounty; they also rejoice for the sake of those who have not yet joined them, but are left behind. "74 In fact, where al-Qaradawi does draw on precedent in his discourse, they are thoroughly modern ones. His usage of the verb baghā (a rebel, someone who has transgressed a boundary) to describe Gaddafi's actions does not appear to draw on the classical discussions of the legitimacy of rebellion, 75 The fatwa" 9. While Michot has preferred to translate baghā ʿalā as "oppress" it is the conjecture here that alQaradawi's own meaning draws on Rida's tafsīr and baghā ʿalā might instead be translated as "rebelling against," or "crossing a boundary in an agreement." The usage of the verb baghā to imply transgression of a boundary is also found in the Constitution of Medina. El Fadl, Rebellion 37. For more on al-Qaradawi's own interpretation of the Constitution of Medina see Warren & Gilmore, "One Nation Under God?" 76 There has been more than a little debate relating to the authorship of the tafsīr. While it is credited as being authored by both Rashid Rida and Muhammad ʿAbduh (d. 1905 ). In view of recent scholarship and ʿAbduh's early death it has become more accepted that Rida played a far more creative role in the Tafsīr's authorship than he was originally credited, leading Jane McAuliffe to agree with Jacques Jomier's original statement that "the (āyat al-baghy)" (49:9), 77 rather than interpreting this in reference to rebellion against the ruler as per historical precedent, Rida by contrast first posits the idea that it might be the ruler who is in fact the rebel. 78 In Michot's own extension, the issue for the legal tradition and alQaradawi then becomes not one of "rebellion against the ruler (khurūj ʿalā al-sulṭān)" but the rebellion of the ruler against the people (khurūj al-sulṭān ʿalā al-shaʿb) or, rather, "When it is not the people who rise in arms against a regime but it is the regime which starts massacring them -because of peaceful demonstrations for example -that power loses its legitimacy and religious scholars must intervene to defend the believers." 79 Notably, al-Qaradawi's creativity even involved a marked shift from his own thought prior to the uprisings. In his Jurisprudence of Jihad, al-Qaradawi had argued that even "apostate regimes" ought to be resisted and changed through peaceful means (al-wājib itikhādh al-wasāʾil al-silmiyya fi'l-taghyyīr), 80 and when the violent extremist group alJamaʿa al-Islamiyya renounced violence in 2002, al-Qaradawi was the key scholar they cited, in a move he naturally applauded. 81 The Egyptian uprising and Libyan civil war clearly represented a radically new context for al-Qaradawi, incommensurable with past precedents. Importantly, the fact that the interests and aims of the vast majority of his backers and audiences were aligned in wishing for the departures of Mubarak and Gaddafi certainly facilitated his strategy of intervening in the public sphere to "make the most of the opportunity to present a jurisprudence of revolutions to the Umma. followed in Bahrain and the Syria represented a far more complex proposition however, with al-Qaradawi's own interventions taking a rather different form.
Sectarianism & Jihad in Bahrain & Syria
While al-Qaradawi's return to Cairo and his fatwa against Gaddafi were widely reported in both the international and local Arabic media from a range of supportive or concerned perspectives, it was with the uprisings in Bahrain and Syria that al-Qaradawi's carefully cultivated image as a politically independent figure would suffer hugely (as would alJazeera's). For the purposes of this article, these two uprisings differed markedly from those that preceded them on the basis of their large Shiʿa populations, 83 and it was the contribution of al-Qaradawi to actually inflaming their sectarian nature that was seen as particularly striking. The Bahraini uprising began with protesters gathering around its Pearl Roundabout on 15 February 2011. Taking a similar course to its counterparts, police repression begot larger and larger demonstrations. As the cycle of ever-increasing demonstrations and repression grew more brutal, one of al-Qaradawi's IUMS colleagues, the prominent Shiʿa scholar from Najaf Muhammad ʿAli Taskhiri "support the revolutionaries in Syria with all that they might need, both materially and morally," a role taken on by both Qatar and Saudi Arabia it would seem. 86 This stance would shift markedly on 31 May 2013 during the battle for the strategic town of Qusayr near the Lebanese border. As the reported involvement of fighters from the Lebanese Shiʿa movement Hizb Allah appeared to be tipping the balance in favour of the regime, al-Qaradawi used his Friday sermon to state "everyone who is able, who knows how to fight, who knows how to use weapons, who knows how to use the sword or the gun […] everyone who is able, must go to Syria to aid their brothers." 87 While also condemning Russia as the "enemy of Muslims" for their arming of the regime, al-Qaradawi's anger was focused on Hizb Allah and Iran, taking on a markedly sectarian tone:
You know these men from Lebanon? They're called the Party of God! The Party of God! They're the Party of the Devil [al-ṭāghūt]! The Party of the Satan [al-shayṭān]! […] They're killing the people of Qusayr! They're killing the men, the old men, the women, the children! […] Tens of thousands of these men have come from Iran! From Iraq! From Lebanon! From such a multitude of countries, from all the countries of the Shiʿa! They're coming from all over the place -to fight the Sunnis, and all those who stand with them, the Christians, the Kurds. 88 Al-Qaradawi then turns his attention specifically to the ʿAlawite community from which the al-Asad regime draws much of its support. Historically known also as "Nusayris," alQaradawi paraphrases the fatwas of the Syrian scholar Taqi al-Din b. Taymiyya (d.1328) to state, 89 "I'm not talking about all the Nusayris, there are some among the Nusayris who are standing with the people, but the majority of the Nusayris, this group whom the Shaykh alIslam Ibn Taymiyya said were 'more unbelieving (akfar) than Christians or Jews,' we have seen them start to kill the people (al-shaʿb)." 90 What makes this stance all the more striking is that it represents a marked shift away from his own highly-publicised previous advocacy for rapprochement between Sunnis and Shiʿa, which was again more concerned with political unity than questions of theology. Yaron Friedman has argued that Ibn Taymiyya's defining of the Nusayri/ʿAlawites and other heterodox sects as apostate (murtadd), of greater concern and "more unbelieving" than Christians, Jews and polytheists stemmed from an anxiety to preserve the integrity of the Muslim community against its external enemies, most notably the Mongols with whom the Nusayri/ʿAlawites had sided against the Mamluk rulers of Syria and Egypt. 91 With that in mind, al-Qaradawi's interpretation and citing of Ibn Taymiyya here can be seen as similarly less concerned with the Nusayri/ʿAlawites status as believing Muslims and more with mobilizing political unity and support in the Syrian civil war. This interpretation is further supported by the fact that, in other works, al-Qaradawi does not simplistically take the legal tradition's usage of the term kufār (sing., kāfir) to be a blanket reference to all non-Muslim "unbelievers" regardless of time, place or context, but instead understands it to mean those non-Muslims who are actively fighting Muslims at a particular time (al-kāfir al-ḥarbī).
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A common theme found in al-Qaradawi's oeuvre, since his days as an organiser of Azhari volunteers to fight the British occupation of the Suez Canal, is the perceived need to preserve the embattled Muslim community's unity in the face of external military and cultural attack. 93 Sagi Polka similarly argues that al-Qaradawi's earlier ecumenicist moves were primarily motivated by the attempt to preserve Sunni-Shiʿa unity against both the Americans in Iraq and the Israelis. During the 2006 conflict between Israel and Hizb Allah, for example, al-Qaradawi was a prominent supporter of the Shiʿa movement and Polka cites him as stating "there is nothing wrong with the Lebanese resistance being Shiʿi, so long as they are the ones who take up arms and shoulder the burden of purging Muslim lands from Israeli filth. They were victorious in the past and liberated [Southern Lebanon] from the Jews […] I can see no difference between Sunni and Shiʿa." At that time, al-Qaradawi issued a fatwa in support of Hizb Allah, aimed as a counter to the Saudi Arabian ʿulamāʾ who had stated that any support extended to Hizb Allah was forbidden on the basis that they were a Shiʿa movement. 94 Looking more broadly at the political context in the Gulf, the inflaming of sectarianism particularly in Bahrain and Saudi Arabia has been a marked counterrevolutionary strategy since the start of the Bahraini uprising, supported by their respective https://sites.google.com/site/jhoover363/taymiyyan-studies/jihad-against-the-mongols (accessed 22 December 2013). I am grateful to Jon Hoover for these references. For a discussion of three later fatwas issued in reference to the Alawites in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries see Yvette Talhamy, "The Fatwas and the Nusayri/Alawis of Syria" Middle Eastern Studies 46:2 (2010) 175-94. 92 An example of al-Qaradawi's understanding of kāfir in this manner can be seen in his discourse on the jurisprudence for Muslim minorities (fiqh al-aqalliyyāt). In that context he discusses a well-known hadith that can be taken to mean "the Muslim does not inherit from the unbeliever (lā yarithu al-muslimu al-kāfira)." In contemporary times, that hadith has commonly been cited to argue that Muslim converts may not inherit from their non-Muslim relatives. In this instance however, and following the interpretation of Ibn Taymiyya's student Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya, al-Qaradawi contrastingly argues that the term kāfir in that hadith was understood by the first Muslims (who were naturally also 'converts' as it were) as meaning those non-Muslims who were actively fighting against the young Muslim community at the time (al-kāfir al-ḥarbī). al-Qaradawi, Fī Fiqh al-Aqalliyyāt al-Muslima 58. Sunni ʿulamāʾ.
95 Al-Qaradawi's "admission" to his Saudi Arabian colleagues in the wake of his 31 May 2013 sermon that he had been "wrong" to trust Hizb Allah previously signals a closer alignment with the Saudi Arabian perspective that views Iran and its support for the Syrian regime as an overt geo-political threat. 96 In that context Saudi Arabia and Qatar see eye to eye in their backing for the armed opposition, and this is now supported by alQaradawi, for example through his public and specific point of thanks following his sermon "to the State of Qatar, its Emir, government and people for their supporting of the Arab revolutions, and the Syrian revolution specifically," 97 as he had also done previously with Libya. 98 The furore that erupted after al-Qaradawi's 31 May sermon proved not only hugely damaging to Qatar's international brand however.
99 It was also a source of consternation among his own personal staff, recognising in his call for foreign Muslim fighters to travel to Syria a potentially dramatic escalation of the conflict, and a further facilitation of its apparent shift away from a battle with a single military regime toward a broader and far more dangerous sectarian conflict.
100 Given al-Qaradawi's oft-stated desire to seek the centre ground in any debate as a means of preserving intra-Muslim unity, be it political or theological, one can surmise in this instance that now, for him, a middle ground in the Syrian civil war simply no longer exists.
In terms of the legal tradition explicitly here, al-Qaradawi's articulation of a more clearly sectarian perspective toward the Syrian civil war and his reading of Ibn Taymiyya see him withdrawing from his more creative discourses of 2011, with his push to conceptualise aviews were sought by the local Egyptian media, his response, like that of the Brotherhood, was uncompromisingly supportive of Morsi, with those who went out to demonstrate being described simply as "thugs (balṭagiyya)."
101 At that time, Khalil al-Anani attributed this stance on behalf of the Brotherhood to the prevalence of what he termed as the ordeal (miḥna) narrative, defined as "the sense of tribulation and victimization that prevails among the rank-and-file in the [Brotherhood] and enables them to confront or tolerate external pressure […] It is incessantly constructed and reproduced by the [Brotherhood] leaders in order to maintain members' solidarity and commitment".
102 This was also evidenced by Brotherhood spokesman Mahmoud Ghuzlan's statement to the Egyptian daily al-Masri alYawm in April which noted that "the opposition is an evil force [that] seeks to sabotage the revolution and exclude the [Brotherhood] ." 103 The lasting experience of brutal repression as a young man has been a formative one for al-Qaradawi too, the themes of ordeal and perseverance (ṣabr) in the face of oppression inform the titles of two of his books in fact. 104 Like many in the Brotherhood leadership, the early volumes of al-Qaradawi's autobiography are replete with instances of arrest and imprisonment (a total of five times), 105 and it was observed during the author's own periods of fieldwork and visits to al-Qaradawi's home that all of the members of his personal staff were young Egyptian men often affiliated with the Brotherhood and often from Nasr City, a part of Cairo where the movement has always been popular.
106 Al-Qaradawi's personal staff provide him with a daily synopsis of current events, which they discuss following the midday prayer, and the day before his Friday sermons he solicits their opinions on appropriate subjects for his sermon (a way of staying in touch with the "Arab Street" as it were, see Figure 1 ). In view of al-Qaradawi's emphasis in his oeuvre on the importance of "a deep and true understanding of the social reality (fiqh al-wāqiʿ)," the role of his staff in the dialogical construction of this "social reality" is significant given their shared experience of oppression.
days leading up to the first protests, al-Qaradawi had returned to Cairo and his 30 June broadcast on al-Jazeera's newly created channel, aimed specifically at Egypt (al-Jazeera Mubashir Misr), was a clear message of support for the President, while also showing his apparent despair at the course the revolution had taken since 2011 where:
Everyone loved his brother as he loved his own self; even preferred his brother to himself. We saw individuals who tired themselves so that their brothers would be comfortable, stayed up at night so that their brothers could sleep […] Following the enormous demonstrations centring round Tahrir Square, the military intervened on 3 July, and Brotherhood leaders were rounded up and imprisoned. AlQaradawi's intervention again came in the form of a fatwa that prompted a vociferous response from large portions of the Egyptian media and the military's supporters. In contrast to his earlier creativity and utilitarianism at the start of 2011, his falling back upon the legal tradition's historical precedents (as seen in his reading of Ibn Taymiyya) continued, with alQaradawi structuring his discourse very clearly within the historical quietism surrounding the legitimacy of the ruler. In keeping with his earlier writings on the Islamic state al-Qaradawi emphasised the oath of loyalty (bayʿa) granted to Morsi by the leader of the coup General alSisi along with the Egyptian people as a whole, with the democratic elections being the equivalent of an authoritative consensus (ijmāʿ) of the Muslim community.
109 Al-Qaradawi then argued that with Morsi's electoral victory an ʿaqd (social contract) had been formed between himself and the Egyptian people, meaning that they had "given him their trust and their commitment to listen and be obedient in [times of both] hardship and ease, whether they liked him or disliked him." In contrast to the previous cases when al-Qaradawi had called on the various regimes' militaries not to be obedient to their leaders (an act of disobedience to God in his view), al-Qaradawi asks "how could people who waited over thirty years under the dictatorship of Mubarak not wait even one year under Morsi?" 110 As al-Qaradawi elaborated on his legal reasoning further, he argued that supporters of the coup were "mistaken from a [both] constitutional perspective and that of [political] legitimacy. As for the constitutional perspective, the President was elected democratically, there is no argument or doubting that, he must continue for the length of his appointed term, which is four years." Al-Qaradawi then expanded on his conception of Morsi's political legitimacy:
As far as the perspective of legitimacy is concerned, truly the Islamic law that is desired by the people of Egypt as an authoritative reference in a civil state (al-dawla al-madaniyya), not a religious theocratic state, makes it a duty for all those who believe in it and refer to it to be obedient to the legitimately elected President, implement his commands, and respond positively to his directives in relation to all matters of public life. This is on the basis of two conditions. First: That the people not be commanded to do something that is disobedient (maʿṣiyya) to God, this is indisputable for Muslims. This is confirmed by abundant Prophetic Hadith which were related by al-Bukhari, Muslim and others besides them […] Second: To not order the people to do something that would put them outside their religion and into outright blasphemy (al-kufr al-buwāḥ) […] This is what has come down in the hadith of ʿUbayda [b. al-Samit], may God be pleased with him, "We pledged to the messenger of God to listen and obey during [times of both] hardship and ease, to endure when being discriminated against and not to dispute about rule those in power, except in cases of evident deviation from that for which there is a [clear] proof from God."
111
In the citation of this final hadith, al-Qaradawi was drawing on the second major historical tenet of Islamic legal tradition as it relates to the ruler's legitimacy. Alongside the ʿaqd there is the question of the "Just Ruler (al-ʿadīl)," and here al-Qaradawi can be seen to define 109 While al-Qaradawi is not specific, given that he also notes Morsi won fifty one per cent of the vote, he would presumably be referring to what he has termed elsewhere as an "ijmāʿ of the majority." On that basis alQaradawi has also argued that voting was a duty (farḍ) incumbent upon every Muslim, legally commensurate with their testifying in a courtroom to the ruler's suitability. Morsi's justness in relation to the tradition's more clearly quietist strand, whereby the ruler remains legitimate unless he either clearly and publicly renounces his Islam or commands his subjects to act in a manner in clear contravention to an explicit legal ruling, thereby becoming a source of fitna (civil strife) himself. 112 Until such a point is reached, it is better for subjects to persevere rather than risk the chaos of open rebellion according to al-Qaradawi, especially because Morsi was a just ruler who came to power in a just manner, through a free and fair election regulated by a constitution.
Just as the coup divided Egyptian society, so too did it divide al-Qaradawi's own family. His biography and other more personal writings are littered with references to his children's educational and professional achievements, a far cry from his own upbringing in poverty. Particularly, al-Qaradawi appears to take great pride in describing his son ʿAbd alRahman as a "revolutionary poet" who had been a staunch opponent of the Mubarak regime and "among the first to participate in the revolution from its very beginning." 113 Following his father's fatwa however, ʿAbd al-Rahman's response was quick:
My dear and beloved father, I am your student before I am your son, but it appears to me and many of your supporters and students that this moment, with its new complications and difficulties is completely different from the experience of your generation […] Sir, it was not our generation that persevered under dictatorship for thirty years, it was your generation that did that in the name of "perseverance (ṣabr)." As for our generation, we have learned not to permit authoritarianism to take root. 114 Al-Qaradawi had returned to Egypt on 29 June, soon after the abdication of the Qatari Emir Hamad b. Khalifa Al Thani in favour of his son Tamim on 25 June. 115 The abdication had come amid much speculation over Qatar's future foreign policy. In Tamim's first speech, he highlighted his specific "rejection of divisions in Arab societies on sectarian lines," 116 which was interpreted as a direct reference to al-Qaradawi's 31 May sermon. 117 Coinciding as it did with several days of sudden silence by al-Qaradawi, this led to rumours 118 that al-Qaradawi had in fact been expelled from Qatar with his citizenship withdrawn. Both parties responded quickly with denials and al-Qaradawi soon returned to Doha, though the statement on Qaradawi.net, that he had gone to Egypt for "his summer vacation (ijāzatihi al-ṣayfiyya)," appeared unusual to say the least. 119 In the days and weeks that followed, opposition to the ousting of Muhammad Morsi coalesced around two large protest camps near the Rabiʿa al-ʿAdawiyya mosque and al-Nahda Square in Nasr city. The increasingly violent clashes around these camps and across Cairo prompted al-Qaradawi to broadcast a statement from own his location in Nasr city where he pleaded for international organisations and Muslims from countries across the Middle East and beyond to come to Egypt "so that they might be witnesses (li-yakūnū shuhadāʾ)" to what was happening. 120 In the Qurʾanic verse 2:143, from which al-Qaradawi derives his concept of wasaṭiyya ("So we have appointed you a nation of the middle way, so that you may be witnesses (li-takūnū shuhadāʾ) against mankind") "shuhadāʾ" is taken to mean "witnesses." In modern standard Arabic however it is more commonly translated as "martyrs." It was on the basis of this second meaning (al-Qaradawi apparently calling for Muslims to come to Egypt to be "martyrs"), that it was then mistakenly and widely broadcast in both the international and local media that al-Qaradawi had in fact declared a second Jihad, this time against the Egyptian army. This incident prompted responses ranging from horror to ridicule, and even a counter-fatwa from al-Azhar 121 Al-Qaradawi's staff were forced to issue a rather humiliating clarification that such a declaration had never occurred. 122 What is noteworthy about this incident is less related to how al-Qaradawi's words were misinterpreted but, in recalling Asad's point that for a discourse to be understood authoritatively it must be a "collaborative achievement between narrator and audience,"
123 it demonstrates the extent to which al-Qaradawi's audience in Egypt, and also abroad, 124 had fractured; the only segment of the population that appeared to understand him in the manner he seemed to intend had shrunk solely to the constituency that supported the Brotherhood.
The violent clearing of the protest camps by the Egyptian military on 14 August prompted relations between al-Qaradawi and the al-Azhar leadership to plumb new depths. 125 Appearing again on al-Jazeera, a visibly shaken al-Qaradawi pleaded to his fellow Egyptians to "Take to the streets! […] It is a religious obligation (farḍ ʿayn) on all Egyptians who are able, who believe in God and his message, to go out from their homes" and protest. 126 This led to an acrimonious and very public dispute breaking out between al-Qaradawi and the two colleagues, the prominent Egyptian Islamist intellectual Muhammad ʿImara and Moroccan scholar Ahmad al-Raysuni, al-Qaradawi gave a tit-for-tat rejoinder and argued that it was the army and their supporters who represented the real "khawārij." In response to Jumʿa's argument that the tamarrud protesters represented the unanimity of the people alQaradawi argued, "What is important is that a person cannot become the legitimate ruler except through a constitution […] constitutions regulate people, people [cannot] proceed according to their whims." Al-Qaradawi then cited the very same hadith found in Jumʿa's argument, but to the opposite purpose. Speaking quickly and rambling slightly, al-Qaradawi said "whoever wants to come out against the legitimate ruler [Morsi] we apply this [aforementioned] hadith to them we didn't come out in rebellion, we want our legitimate ruler. Who cancelled the constitution?" 132 In al-Qaradawi's view it is the Brotherhood and their supporters who represented the unanimity of Egyptians (he refers to them simply as "the people") and, responding to Jumʿa's accusation that the protesters were armed, stated:
All that has been carried out by the Egyptian people has been peaceful resistance, as was declared by the General Guide of the Brotherhood [Muhammad Badiʿ] standing at Rabiʿa al-ʿAdawiyya. I heard him saying our revolution is a peaceful revolution and it will remain peaceful and our peacefulness is stronger than the bullet, if others use bullets then we are not with them: no bullets, swords, knives, sticks, stones or bricks. 133 Toward the end of the program, the presenter ʿUthman ʿUthman, perhaps aware of the fallout from al-Qaradawi's previous supposed call to violence against the Egyptian army asked:
UU: Forgive me mawlanā a final word, is what has occurred [in the program] is it a call to violence or peace? YQ: Whatever is done to us there is no possibility that we will use violenceviolence is finished on behalf of either the Islamists or the Brotherhood, violence is finished, no violence from us God Willing, we come to everyone in peace. 134 Their debate would rumble on for some weeks, with Jumʿa deriding al-Qaradawi as senile and suffering from Alzheimer's, 135 and with al-Qaradawi responding in kind, aiming at Jumʿa's credentials and credibility as an ʿālim. 136 This exchange and the personal invective involved can be seen not only as a demonstration of how deeply both parties were invested in the politics of ongoing events, but also as a result of the ʿulamāʾ's increasing use of utilitarian ‫دﯾﻦ‬ -
Both Jumʿa and al-Qaradawi's legal discourses can be seen to resemble each other to a significant degree: they both claimed the al-Sisi and Morsi were the legitimate rulers supported by an authoritative consensus of the people, with al-Qaradawi citing the election result and Jumʿa the huge numbers of protesters that took to the streets on 30 June 2013 and remained there until the military intervention. Similarly their citations of the same hadith, "He who comes to you when you are united and wants to disunite your community, kill him," in support of their respective causes are equally nebulous. Figure 3 ). 138 Al-Qaradawi and his colleagues are well aware of the damaging impact these visceral debates have on their public standing, and their response has been to emphasise (but perhaps do not practice to the same extent), the "etiquette of disputation (adab al-ikhtilāf)," and its sharp distinction from divisive disputes (al-tafarruq) that serve no one. In the third volume of al-Qaradawi's memoirs for example, he refers to a particularly outspoken debate between the two Syrian scholars Nasr al-Din al-Albani and ʿAbd al-Fattah Abu Ghudda. The inclusion of debates between rival scholars is a common pedagogical theme of the ʿulamāʾ's memoirs and, rather than attempting to replicate them verbatim there usually is the depiction of one scholar "winning" the debate and exposing the failing of the other's arguments. In al-Qaradawi's discussion of that debate however, what was emphasised instead was how damaging it was to the ʿulamāʾ's prestige as a whole, with al-Qaradawi opining instead that "this battle between the scholars was not necessary […] and had the effect of blinding the two sides in a cloud of dust and smoke, and harmed both of them. 139 At the timing of writing (December 2013), there have been no further broadcasts on Sharia and Life at all, a clear demonstration of the fact that for all alQaradawi's apparent prestige, he is very much dependent on Qatari goodwill and subordinate to their foreign policy aims.
Conclusion: The Place of the ʿUlamāʾ and the Legal Tradition after the Uprisings
This article has sought to follow the course charted by Yusuf al-Qaradawi over the past three years, tumultuous as they have been, as a bell-weather for assessing the ʿulamāʾ's fortunes in the public sphere. In so doing, the article began by drawing on Talal Asad's conception of a "discursive tradition." This concept was posited as representing a centre-ground between both essentialist understandings of traditions (or cultures) and their texts as determining forces that overly constrained individual agency, and those who saw articulations of tradition entirely as social, political or economic agendas voiced by other means. Ovamir Anjum argues aptly then, "Rather than the 'thick descriptions' of theatrical subjects who simply 'behave' in accordance with the roles determined for them by either their material structure or culture, it is the arguments and discourses of the thinking subjects with their specific styles of reasoning couched in their historical and material context that become the focus." 140 Using that approach as the framework of analysis, the ʿulamāʾ have been seen to be playing an increasingly activist role in the region's emerging religious public sphere with the most prolific among them expanding the legal tradition's concepts of maṣlaḥa and iftāʾ to such an extent that any prevailing social or political issues of the day might come within their purview as ʿulamāʾ. With the boundaries between their fatwas and other discourses becoming blurred to a far greater extent than previously, this has increasingly involved a reliance on individual utilitarian reasoning, with Nakissa terming the creative moves by the ʿulamāʾ to conceptualise new subfields of jurisprudence to structure this reasoning as "secondary segmentation," seen most clearly with al-Qaradawi's fiqh al-thawra.
A number of constituencies combined to produce al-Qaradawi as a "Global Mufti" on the eve of the Arab uprisings. His close relationship to the Muslim Brotherhood, the Qatari royal family, as well as the legal tradition and his diverse audiences all exercised their own demands and constraints. Referring heuristically for a moment to Pierre Bourdieu's theory of capital, these constituents could be seen to be individually contributing to al-Qaradawi's "symbolic capital," that is, "the aggregate of the actual or potential resources which are linked to possession of a durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition."
141 It was when the interests of all these various constituents were aligned that al-Qaradawi was able to project his discourse, and have it received and understood, with unparalleled force as seen on his return to Cairo on 18 February 2011 or with his fatwa against Gaddafi three days later. Moreover, Bourdieu attributed symbolic capital's authoritative effect to an audience's "misrecognition" of the unacknowledged power relations that had produced it, or rather:
The symbolic efficacy of words [here we might say al-Qaradawi's words] is exercised only in so far as the person subjected to it recognizes the person who exercises it as authorised to do so, or, what amounts to the same thing, only in so far as he fails to realize that, in submitting to it, he himself has contributed, through his recognition, to its establishment.
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Here it was seen that the perception of an ʿālim's independence from subjective political interests was most important, and it is argued here that when the interests of al-Qaradawi's diverse support base and various audiences became misaligned, over Bahrain, Syria, the 3 July coup and so on, his stature was seen to be significantly weakened. The powers and interests behind al-Qaradawi became increasingly "recognisable," and he received growing criticism for his links to Qatari foreign policy and the Muslim Brotherhood.
That weakening of al-Qaradawi's stature saw his own reasoning become more conservative, with his earlier ecumenism being replaced by a withdrawal into a conservative reading of Ibn Taymiyya rather than a creative attempt to counter the rising sectarianism in the Syrian civil war, for example. Similarly, the aftermath of the mass protests against the Muslim Brotherhood and the coup saw him fall back upon the legal tradition's quietist historical precedents, with his fatwa affirming the obedience owed by the people to their ruler in lieu of his committal of outright blasphemy and being a source of fitna. The divisions within Egyptian society in the wake of coup were evident for al-Qaradawi not only in his discourse no longer being recognised as authoritative to the same degree as it had been two years previously, but with it actually being quite literally misunderstood by segments of the public, with his call for foreign Muslims to come and "witness" the army's brutality apparently being understood as a call to violence and martyrdom. This led to a growing backlash against his role voiced by the public, the media (see Figure 4) , and even his own son.
The debate between al-Qaradawi and Jumʿa was remarkable not only for personal invective involved, but also because of the similarity of the legal discourses they voiced to diametrically opposed political ends. As noted with reference to Bourdieu, this might be seen as making it increasingly easier for the public to "recognise" the political and power relations that would otherwise have served to render their discourses authoritative. Consequently, unable to conceptualise a further subfield of fiqh to protect himself from charges of subjectivism, al-Qaradawi's (and Jumʿa's) reasoning were viewed as increasingly biased, a trend that will likely continue as the ʿulamāʾ engage with an increasingly fractured public sphere during the particularly fraught political context that will persist in the coming years, or even worsen. 
